Article 2nd half
The DIP’s insistence that the UK remains committed to meeting the Hague Summit’s agreement on defence investment will be noted. But it will meet some skepticism in the absence of a fully funded pathway to that goal – the UK’s wider economic and fiscal challenges are well-known to allies. The DIP’s very next sentence, which states that ‘All Allies will review the trajectory and spend in 2029, when NATO next reviews its capability plans’ is open to (mis)interpretation: it could be seen as a signal that the UK hopes that it will not be held to the full NATO targets.
However, the DIP has stayed broadly true to the ‘NATO first’ direction set by the SDR. And it contains many elements which should make the UK a more useful ally and a more attractive collaborative partner.
Whether it steps up UK leadership within NATO and more broadly will depend upon its implementation. The sense in recent years is that the UK tends to over-promise and under-deliver on defence. That can still be corrected. The publication of the DIP should be the start point for doing so.